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Abstract 
This paper presents three encoding strategies based on digital 
logic for steganography on Voice over IP (VoIP), which aim to 
enhance the embedding transparency. Differing from previous 
approaches, our strategies reduce the embedding distortion by 
improving the similarity between the cover and the covert mes-
sage using digital logical transformations, instead of reducing 
the amount of the substitution bits. Therefore, by contrast, our 
strategies will improve the embedding transparency without 
sacrificing the embedding capacity. Of these three strategies, the 
first one adopts logical operations, the second one employs cir-
cular shifting operations, and the third one combines the oper-
ations of the first two. All of them are evaluated through com-
paring their prototype implementations with some existing 
methods in a prototypical covert communication system based 
on VoIP (called StegVoIP). The experimental results show that 
the proposed strategies can effectively enhance the embed-
ding transparency while maintaining the maximum embedding 
capacity. 
Keywords:  steganography, digital logic, VoIP, transparency, al-
gorithm, design, experimentation, security protection, data com-
munications, insurance, invasive software, unauthorized access 
1. Introduction 
Steganography, a technology of information hiding, has been 
employed increasingly and successfully in covert exchange of 
secret messages [1, 2], watermarking and copyright protecting 
[3], and other practical applications. However, most of the pre-
vious studies on steganography are carried out on storage me-
dia (e.g. image, audio, etc) [4] and by contrast the area of steg-
anography in streaming media is largely unexplored. However, 
as a cover of steganography, streaming media possesses two ad-
vantages over storage media. First, the real-time nature poten-
tially provides better security for secret messages by virtue of its 
instantaneity, because it does not give eavesdroppers sufficient 
amount of time to detect possible abnormity due to hidden mes-
sages. Second, streaming media is a multidimensional cover, in 
which the packet protocol headers and the payload data can be 
used to hide data. Given the potential advantages, steganogra-
phy for real-time streaming media may soon become a worthy 
subject of further studies. In this study, we will focus on a typi-
cal streaming media, Voice over IP (VoIP), as a possible carrier 
to apply steganography. 
VoIP is a promising technique to enable telephone calls via 
a broadband Internet connection. Owing to its advantages of 
low cost and flexible advanced digital features, VoIP has be-
come a popular alternative to public-switched telephone net-
work (PSTN), and extensive research on it has been conducted 
[5]. In recent years, many researchers have carried out useful re-
search on steganography over VoIP [6-12]. Most of them [6-8] 
mainly focus on the embedding methods or implementations 
of steganography on VoIP. Our practical experience and obser-
vation suggest that the encoding problem for VoIP-based steg-
anography is also very important. Generally speaking, encoding 
strategies can be divided into four categories according to their 
objectives. 
1. Capability-Orientated Strategy (COS). COS aims to in-
crease the information capacity of the covert message. It of-
ten involves certain compression codes, such as T-code, Run 
Length Code, etc. 
2. Reliability-Orientated Strategy (ROS). ROS aims to assure 
the correct extraction of covert messages at the receiver side. 
It often involves certain check codes [10] (e.g. Checksum, 
CRC, MD5, etc) or error-correcting codes (e.g. Hamming 
code, BCH code, Turbo code, etc). 
3. Security-Orientated Strategy (SOS). SOS aims to enhance 
the security of the covert message, namely, to avoid or min-
imize the possibility of unauthorized extraction. In [8], the 
authors introduced traditional cryptographies for embed-
ded messages. However, traditional cryptographies are of-
ten time-consuming and incur delays that may in turn de-
grade speech quality drastically, so they do not suit this case 
well. In our previous works, we employed pseudorandom 
binary sequences, namely, the pseudorandom sequence pro-
duced by an improved Mersenne Twiste algorithm [10] and 
the m sequence [12], to encrypt the covert messages with the 
Exclusive OR operation (XOR), which can effectively bal-
ance between adequate security and low latency for real-
time services. 
4. Transparency-Orientated Strategy (TOS). TOS aims to reduce 
the distortion and thereby enhance the transparency of steg-
anography. Generally, a given steganography method is of-
ten believed to possess an inherent transparency. However, 
we argue that the transparency of the given steganography 
method can be improved by proper encoding. In this paper, 
we proposed three encoding strategies used to enhance the 
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transparency of the well-known Least-Significant-Bits (LSBs) 
steganography over VoIP. 
Huang et al. [9] first introduced LSB matching method to 
enhance transparency. In their method, a pseudo random se-
quence (PRS) is used to guide embedding. If the current value of 
the PRS is “1”, the corresponding LSB is replaced with one bit of 
secret messages; otherwise, the corresponding LSB is not modi-
fied. Due to the small amount of substitutions, this method can 
reduce the distortion of the cover speech in comparison with tra-
ditional LSBs steganography, but at the expense of halving the 
maximum capacity. Moreover, in [11], we introduced the notion 
of Partial Similarity Value (PSV) that is the similarity between 
LSBs and covert messages. By properly setting the threshold 
PSV, this approach can adaptively balance between the embed-
ding transparency and the embedding capacity. Although this 
approach emphasizes on the tradeoff between transparency and 
capacity, it indicates that the embedding transparency can be 
enhanced by taking into account the similarity between the cov-
ers and the covert messages. Further, our observations through 
research and experiments suggest that the similarity between 
the covers and the embedded messages can be significantly in-
creased by taking into account some transforms of the embed-
ded messages. Therefore, we are motivated to propose the en-
coding strategies based on digital logic transforms for LSBs 
steganography over VoIP, which can reduce the distortion of the 
embedding and enhance the embedding transparency as a con-
sequence while maintaining the maximum embedding capacity. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pres-
ents the encoding strategies based on digital logic. Section 3 de-
scribes prototype implementations of the proposed strategies 
and some test results, and Section 4 gives concluding remarks 
and future works. 
2. Digital Logic Based Encoding 
As mentioned above, we want to increase the similarity be-
tween the cover and the covert message by virtue of a given set 
of transforms, denoted by F = {f1, f2, …, fr}, where r is the number 
of the transforms. Let us assume that the covert message M is to 
be embedded into the cover C. In order to obtain the best similar-
ity, we perform all transforms in F on M and get the set F(M) = {f1 
(M), f2 (M),…, fr (M)}. Then, we evaluate the similarity between C 
and each element in F(M), and choose the optimal element f(M) 
with the best similarity. Accordingly, we can embed f(M) into C 
to obtain the best transparency. Obviously, we should extract M 
by performing the inverse transform of transform f at the receiver 
side, which suggests that each adopted transform fi Î F must have 
the inverse transform fi -1 and consequently fi -1(fi(M)) = M. In addi-
tion, the computing complexities of the transforms must be small 
enough to meet the requirement of real-time services, which is 
why we employ the digital logic as the encoding transforms. In a 
real-time application, we often adopt “divide and rule” strategy, 
because M is often too large to be considered as a group. In other 
words, we divide C and M into N parts respectively, i.e. C = {C′1, 
C′2, …, C′N} and M = {M′1, M′2, …, M′N}, where C′i = {c′i1, c′i2, …, 
c′il(i)}, M′i = {m′i1, m′i2, …, m′il(i)}, l(i) is the length of the ith part, i 
= 1, 2, …, N. Generally, the length of C is greater than or equal to 
the length of M. Here, we assume that their lengths are equal for 
the convenience of the description. Therefore, the lengths satisfy 
the following equation: 
LM = LC = 
N
∑
i=1
 l(i)                                            (1) 
where, LM and LC are the lengths of M and C respectively. Ac-
cordingly, the transforms will be performed in parts and partial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
similarity value (PSV) [11] will be introduced to evaluate the 
similarity. For the LSBs steganography, PSV indicates the num-
ber of identical bits between the message part and the corre-
sponding cover part. The following text will present our digital 
logic based encoding strategies in detail. 
2.1 Encoding Based on Logical Operations 
As is well known, the common logical operations include 
AND, OR, XOR, and NOT. However, we can only choose XOR 
and NOT, because the others have no inverse operations. More-
over, since it is performed between two elements, we need to in-
troduce a PRS as the reference sequence (RS) when using XOR. 
Typical PRS candidates include m sequence [12, 13], chaotic se-
quence [14], sequence generated by toral automorphisms [15], 
etc. We denote RS as S = {S′1, S′2, …, S′N} and still assume that 
the length of S (denoted by LS) is equal to the length of M and C, 
i.e. LS = LM = LC. We can define the transforms in Table 1. 
As mentioned above, we perform each transform on the 
given part, and choose its optimal form to embed into the cover. 
In order to inform the adopted transform to the receiver, we set 
a binary code for each transform. The length of each code (de-
noted by Lcode) can be determined by the following formula: 
Lcode =  élog2(Q*)ù                                      (2) 
where, Q* is the number of the adopted transforms. If we choose 
all the transforms in Table 1, then Lcode = 3, which means there 
are 3 (23 – 5) binary codes left to be unused. Therefore, we prefer 
to choose four transforms among them to get the optimal Lcode 
= 2. Figure 1 illustrates the embedding process, in which trans-
forms 1, 3, 4, and 5 are adopted. Another problem is how to 
transmit these indicating codes to the receiver. In our previous 
study [12], we presented a synchronization mechanism using 
techniques of the protocol steganography, in which synchroni-
zation patterns are hidden in the unused and/or optional fields 
of the header of a certain packet. In the IP header, there are a to-
tal of 64 bits that can be used to embed messages [16]. Moreover, 
the headers of upper-level protocols (e.g. RTP, etc) also have 
many unused or optional fields. Therefore, we can distribute the 
codes among those fields in a predetermined manner. We will 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The transforms definition of strategy 1 
No.      Op.      Transform      No.     Op.     Transform 
 1  ORI  ORI(M′i)  4  NOT  NOT(S′i) 
 2  ORI  ORI(S′i)  5  XOR  XOR(M′i, S′i) 
 3  NOT  NOT(M′i)  —  ———  ——— 
Note: (1) M′i Î M and S′i Î S ; (2) ORI(x) = x, x = M′i or S′i. 
Figure 1. The embedding process using strategy 1 
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give a specific example in Section 3 to illustrate this approach. 
The receiver knows exactly how and where the codes are em-
bedded. The receiver first checks the codes and further extracts 
the corresponding hidden parts when receiving an IP packet. 
After collecting all the parts, the receiver can successfully resti-
tute the whole secret message. 
2.2 Encoding Based on Shifting Operations 
The shifting operations, which allow bits to be moved to the 
left or right in a word, are often used in serial transfer of data. 
There are three types of shifting operations: logical, arithmetic, 
and circular. The first two types cannot be adopted in our strat-
egy, for they have no inverse operations that can be used to get 
the original data. However, as its name implies, the circular shift 
circulates the bits in the given word around the two ends without 
loss of information, so we can recover the original data by the op-
posite shift. The circular shift involves the circular shift left (CSL) 
and the circular shift right (CSR). For an x-bit word, a CSL by x-
y bits (denoted by CSL(x-y), 0 ≤ y ≤ x) is equivalent to a CSR by y 
bits (denoted by CSL(y)). Therefore, we define the circular shift 
based transforms that consist of the operation codes (Op. code) 
and the shift numbers. Figure 2 depicts a set of transforms for 8-
bit words. As the figure shows, the first 1 bit marked with under-
line in each code is used to represent the Op. code, namely Op. = 
1 represents CSR; and Op. = 0 represents CSL. In this strategy, the 
length of each code (Lcode) depends on the operation word (one 
part of the message) and can be determined as follows: 
Lcode =  élog2(n)ù                                        (3) 
where, n is the length of the given part. The rest process can be 
performed similarly as in strategy 1. 
2.3 Hybrid Strategy 
We can merge the two strategies above. A straightfor-
ward method may be to merge these transforms directly. How-
ever, due to the difference between these transforms′ character-
istics, the codes of unequal length have to be adopted. Namely, 
the codes for the transforms in strategy 1 are tantamount to the 
Op. codes, and the codes for the transforms in strategy 2 include 
the Op. codes and the shift numbers. This will incur more cost in 
bits to represent the code and induce an intractable synchroniza-
tion problem. Thus, the value of this method is limited. Another 
method is to first apply the two strategies in each packet and 
choose the one with the larger total PSV as the final strategy. This 
method needs extra 1- bit flag to indicate which strategy is finally 
adopted. However, due to the option of more transforms, we can 
further enhance the transparency for the embedding process. 
3. Implementation and Test 
This section will give specific examples illustrating the pro-
posed strategies and evaluate them in StegVoIP that is a proto-
typical covert communication system based on VoIP [10-12]. 
StegVoIP supports typical coders, such as G.711, G.723.1, G.729a, 
etc. In the prototype implementations, we typically adopt G.729a 
as the codec of the cover speech, while the strategies can also ef-
fectively work in conjunction with other coders. Similarly, we 
choose 8 LSBs (the bits with the least impact on the speech qual-
ity) in each G.729a frame based on the observation that the param-
eters of fixed codebook have the best transparency for data hiding 
[11, 12]. We consider the embedding process in each packet. Let 
the length of codes in each packet be X, the number of LSBs be Y. 
If the Y LSBs is divided into n parts and the length of the ith part 
is li, for our strategy 1, we can obtain the following equations: 
{  2 ∙ n = X     n∑
i=1
 li = Y                                            (4) 
And, we can obtain the following equations for our strategy 2: 
     {      n∑i=1 log2 li = X             n∑
i=1
 li = Y                      (5) 
We employ the identification field of the IPv4 header to hide the 
codes of transforms. As proposed in [17], the high 8 bits of the 
identification field can be used for data hiding, so we can set X 
= 8. Moreover, we set the payload of each packet at 4 frames (40 
octets) in order to not induce the fragment strategy of Internet 
protocol. Consequently, 32 bits are available for data hiding in 
each packet (Y = 32). There are many partition methods. In this 
paper, for strategy 1, LSBs are divided into 4 parts that contain 
8 bits each and each code can be represented by 2 bits; for strat-
egy 2, LSBs are divided into 2 parts that contain 16 bits each and 
each code can be represented by 4 bits. For strategy 3, we em-
ploy the second bit (DF) in the flag field, which represents “do 
not fragment” [16] [17]. Because the packets are not larger than 
the maximum fragment size, the setting of the DF flag has no ef-
fect on the packets′ behavior. Here, DF = 0 indicates that strategy 
1 is adopted, and DF = 1 indicates that strategy 2 is adopted. 
We compare our strategies with the traditional LSBs method 
and the LSB matching method in [9]. We employ m sequences as 
the PRSs used in our strategy 1 and the LSB matching method. 
All m sequences are randomly generated. To compare the trans-
parency of these methods, we define the bit-change rate (BCR) 
as follows: 
BCR = NC ÷ NM                                            (6) 
where, NC is the number of the changed bits, NM is the number 
of the embedded bits. Particularly, BCR for the proposed strate-
gies can be further described as follows: 
                                    
BCR =
     
N
∑
i=1
 (li – ηi)
NM                                               (7) 
where, li and ηi  are respectively the part size and the PSV 
of the ith replaced parts; N is the number of the replaced parts. 
Further, we employ the Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Qual-
ity (PESQ) method [18] to evaluate the speech quality of cover 
audios and their steganographic versions. PESQ compares an 
original signal with a degraded signal and outputs a PESQ score 
as a prediction of the perceived quality. The range of the PESQ 
score is –0.5 to 4.5. Moreover, the PESQ score can be converted 
to Mean Opinion Score–Listening Quality Objective (MOS-
LQO). The range of MOS-LQO is 1.017 (worst) to 4.549 (best), 
which more closely matches the range of subjective Mean Opin-
ion Score (MOS) [19]. For the experiments, we collect 320 ten-
second speech samples.1 These samples consist of two catego-
ries: English speech (including male speech and female speech) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The circular shift based transforms for 8-bit words 
1 Although ITU-T P.862 recommends that the length range of each test 
speech sample is 8 to 30s, PESQ is validated in ITU-T for use with 
signals that are mostly 8-12s long. Therefore, we typically choose the 
10s long audio samples. In addition, so far, PESQ has not been vali-
dated with music as input to a codec, so our test samples do not in-
clude music. 
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and Chinese speech (including male speech and female speech). 
All samples are PCM coded files with 8000 HZ sampling rate, 16 
bits quantization and mono, which are the reference signals in 
the PESQ experiments. For each sample, the corresponding steg-
anography experiments are performed on its G. 729a coded file 
respectively. The secret message (choosing the CALL FOR PA-
PERS file of ACM Multimedia 2009 [20], possibly only some for-
ward parts) can be successfully embedded and retrieved in any 
case. We convert all the steganographic G. 729a encoded files 
into PCM encoded files as the degraded signals and perform the 
PESQ test. In the five methods, the embedding capacities of the 
traditional LSB and the proposed strategies are 8000 bits, but 
the average embedding capacity of the LSB matching method is 
4000 bits. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the statistical results of the 
mean BCR and the mean MOS-LQO for all the five methods. 
From these charts, we can observe that: (1) For the same 
method, the mean MOS-LQO of Chinese speech samples is 
slightly larger than that of English speech samples, which im-
plies that Chinese speech samples may have better embedding 
transparency than English speech samples. (2) The LSB match-
ing method has the largest MOS-LQO, but it halves the embed-
ding capacity. By contrast, the proposed strategies in this paper 
reduce the distortion by decreasing the number of bits changed 
and achieve comparable MOS-LQO scores with that of the LSB 
matching while maintain the maximum embedding capacity. 
In contrast with the traditional LSBs method and the LSB 
matching method, our strategies may increase the complexity of 
steganography. However, the proposed strategies will not im-
pact the real-time services of VoIP, because only a few simple 
digital logic transforms are employed. The readers may find that 
the embedding transparency can be further enhanced if we in-
troduce more transforms. However, more transforms translate 
into higher complexity of the algorithm and more indicating 
codes. Thus, a sensible tradeoff among them should be sought. 
4. Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper presented transparency-orientated encoding strat-
egies for steganography over VoIP. Differing from previous ap-
proaches, the proposed strategies employ digital logic opera-
tions to increase the similarity between the cover and the covert 
message, and thereby effectively reduce the distortion (enhance 
the transparency) while maintaining the maximum embedding 
capacity. From the experiments, we learn that the embedding 
transparency can be enhanced further if we introduce more dig-
ital logic transforms. However, more transforms will likely in-
duce higher complexity of the algorithm and more indicat-
ing codes. Therefore, one must often strike a sensible tradeoff 
among the embedding transparency, the number of required in-
dicating codes and the complexity of the algorithm, which will 
be one of our future works. In addition, we will study other en-
coding strategies, which aim at improving the embedding per-
formance of steganography over VoIP. 
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